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Abstract 
The   term   “neoliberalism”   is   encountered   everywhere   today.   In   popular   leftist   political  
rhetoric it is often simply a place-holder  for  “contemporary  capitalism”,  “austerity  politics”,  
and  “all   that   is  bad   in  our  world”,  giving that rhetoric the appearance of a new diagnostic 
edge. However, one could be excused for thinking that its intelligibility is in inverse 
proportion to its ubiquity. By defining it in terms of its conceptual relationship with classical 
liberalism this paper offers a justification for thinking about our time as period in which a 
particular   “community   of   ideas”   has   sought   (with   some   success)   to   establish   a   neoliberal  
hegemony. Doing so reveals, however, that there are in fact a variety of neoliberalisms, and 
that the period we now inhabit is best conceived in terms of the rise of a distinctively 
economic   variation.   Europe’s   history   is   sketched   (anachronistically)   in   terms   of   shifting  
patterns and transitions in which neoliberal variants vie for power. Setting those transitions 
within a wide-angled  vision  of  Europe’s  modernity  as   inseparable   from  a  movement  of   the  
decentring  of  our  understanding  of  “man”,  the  chance  for  a  new  shift  is  identified  – one to be 
accompanied,  no  doubt,  by  “a  surge  of  laughter”  that  has been heard, regularly and without 
fail,  throughout  the  entirety  of  Europe’s  history. 
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Varieties of Neoliberalism  
 
The Copernican Earth is no longer at the centre of the universe, and this is more and 
more the case one could say. Jacques Derrida  
 
The philosopher is not a citizen of any community of ideas. That is what makes him 
into a philosopher. Ludwig Wittgenstein 
 
Liberal Man  
In a lecture delivered in Prague in 1935, the German philosopher Edmund 
Husserl  introduced  a  worry  he  felt  regarding  what  he  called  “the  total  world-
view  of  modern  man”  (Husserl  1970,  p.  6).  That  world-view was one that had, 
he   thought,   “turned away from the questions which are decisive for 
humanity”  (Husserl  1970,  p.  6).  These  are  “questions  concerning  the  meaning  
or   meaninglessness   of   the   whole   of   human   existence”   (Husserl   1970,   p.   6).  
Blinded by the astonishing success of the natural sciences,  “modern  man”  – 
which he will identify strongly with the culture of modern European 
humanity  with   its  “birthplace”  in  ancient  Greece  – has become indifferent to 
what  natural  sciences  are  themselves  indifferent  to.  As  he  put  it,  “merely  fact-
minded sciences make merely fact-minded   people”   (Husserl   1970,   p.6).    
Husserl made the following plea to his listeners in 1935 regarding the 
“decisive”  questions: 
Do not these questions demand universal reflections and answers 
based on rational insight? In the final analysis they concern man as a 
free, self-determining being. What does science have to say about 
reason and about us men as subjects of this freedom? The mere science 
of bodies clearly has nothing to say; it abstracts from everything 
subjective. As for the humanistic sciences, on the other hand, we are 
Varieties of Neoliberalism 
   2 
told that the scholar carefully excludes all evaluative positions. 
Scientific, objective truth is exclusively a matter of establishing how the 
world is in fact. But can the world, and human existence in it, 
truthfully have a meaning if history has nothing more to teach us than 
that all the shapes of the spiritual world form and dissolve themselves 
like fleeting waves? Can we console ourselves with that? Can we live 
in this world, where historical occurrence is nothing but an unending 
concatenation of illusory progress and bitter disappointment? (Husserl 
1970, pp. 6-7) 
This is a wonderfully rich passage, beautifully summarising a sense of the 
contemporary predicament of modern Europe: of European humanity in the 
times of science finding itself paradoxically but increasingly resistant to any 
substantive  philosophy  of  history   in   terms  of  which  “historical   occurrence”,  
especially its own,   is   the   very   opposite   of   an   “unending   concatentation   of  
illusory  progress”.i We could explore all of its corners and cornerstones. But I 
want for the moment to pick up on just one of its most clear, open, and 
ultimately  most  problematic  assumptions:  namely,  its  conception  of  “man”  – 
the   conception  of   the  being   that   “we  men”   ourselves   are – as   essentially   “a  
free, self-determining  being”,  the  conception  of  man,  and  hence  of  ourselves,  
as rational subjectivity (Husserl 1970, p. 290). 
 
This conception of human life is not one among others. Indeed, it is the 
conception that informs the very sciences that so obsess modern European 
humanity. Man pursues science, and can grasp the objective truth about the 
world when he does so. And the reason why man can do this is 
fundamentally related to reason itself, to the possibility of freely determining 
himself to achieve a rationally grounded and disinterested cognition of the 
world and genuine knowledge of the facts. 
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The great masters of the philosophical tradition from Plato to Descartes to 
Kant and beyond, all subscribe to something like this view of man, of the pure 
humanity of man, as rational subjectivity. I am going to come back to Plato 
shortly, to an incredible moment in an incredible philosophical text, a text 
which (incredibly) helped decisively to shape the whole intellectual culture of 
Europe. But first, I want to note, with Husserl, that none of these great 
thinkers supposed that the only form of rational inquiry worthy of man was 
the exercise of theoretical reason (the pursuit of science). On the contrary, the 
classic view would be that there are various forms of rational activity, and not 
all of them aim at empirical knowledge of facts. Here is a selection of 
candidate interests of reason, all of which those who cleave to a conception of 
man as rational subjectivity might regard as (at least sometimes) worthy of 
man to pursue. I will describe them as varieties of rational cognition, but the 
point here is not to presume that they all aim at knowledge of facts. I simply 
mean  that  the  proper  appreciation  of  their  “objects”  that  they  aim  to  achieve 
in this or that domain are all taken to require the exercise of reason, and hence 
are, for this tradition, one and all regarded as distinctively human cognitive 
interests. 
x Theoretical reason – rational cognition of the world leading to empirical 
knowledge. 
x Practical reason – rational cognition of right action leading in the ethical 
sphere to moral knowledge and in the commercial sphere to economic 
knowledge. 
x Aesthetic judgement – rational cognition of the beautiful and the sublime 
leading to aesthetic knowledge. 
x Religious faith – rational cognition of the supersensory leading to 
knowledge of God.  
x Pure reason – rational cognition of rational cognition leading to wisdom 
(philo-sophia) 
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Let us suppose (concesso non dato)  that  “the  pure  humanity  of  man”  is,  indeed,  
in   the   final   analysis,   as   Husserl   puts   it,   that   of   “a   free,   self-determining 
being”.   If   this   were   true,   what   would   be   the   optimal   conditions   of   human  
flourishing? What would be those conditions in which what is here called 
“man”   can  most   fully   realise   his   being   as   a   free,   self-determining being, as 
rational subjectivity? What are the conditions for the emancipation of rational 
subjectivity?  And  are  these  questions  capable  of  being  given  “answers based 
on  rational  insight”  as  Husserl  supposes? 
 
Although I do not really think it is restricted to political liberalism, for reasons 
that will emerge, I am going to construe what I will call classical liberal thought 
as offering a positive answer to this question. The classical liberal response to 
Husserl’s  worries  that  I  am  envisaging  passes  through  three  steps. 
 
First step: a satisfactory account of the conditions for human flourishing must 
acknowledge the varieties of rational inquiry just outlined. Or to put it 
differently, classical liberal political thought aims to optimize opportunities 
for free performance in different and autonomous domains of human life 
connected to the different interests of reason: 
x Theoretical domain – that part of life lived in devotion to knowledge and 
wisdom (knowledge/ignorance) 
x Economic domain – that part of life lived life lived in devotion to wealth 
creation (profitability/non-profitability) 
x Political domain – that part of life lived life lived in devotion to a 
community of citizens (friend/enemy) 
x Moral domain – that part of life lived in devotion to right action 
(good/evil) 
x Spiritual domain – that part of life lived life lived in devotion to God 
(faith/doubt) 
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x Artistic domain – that part of life lived life lived in devotion to beauty 
(beautiful/ugly) 
x Domestic domain – that part of life lived life lived in devotion to family 
(love/hate) 
The first six are domains that are usually regarded as part of the public sphere; 
the last is the private sphere. Classical liberal thought has been, we should 
note, distinctively gendered with respect to the analysis of rational 
subjectivity   it   offers.   Women’s   “proper”   interests   are   supposed   to   belong  
almost exclusively to the private sphere. 
 
Second step: power should aim to organise the social world in such a way that 
each  person’s  capacity  freely  to  perform  (if  and  where  proper)  in  each  of  these  
domains is optimised. Historically, for women that has meant very little at all 
in anything but the private sphere. For men, however, there should be, within 
reason, and compatible with the scope for other men to do so too, as wide as 
possible opportunity for devoting oneself freely to whatever one especially 
wants to devote oneself to. 
 
The ambition of liberal thought is thus to organise society in such a way that 
it can offer its citizens as great an opportunity as possible (and as appropriate) 
to pursue their rational interests. One can imagine the classical liberal seeing 
all sorts of conflicts, all sorts of trade-offs here: individual efforts to strike a 
balance between incommensurable ambitions and desires, and the sacrifices 
one  might  have  to  make  in  pursuit  of  one’s  chosen  interests.  There  will  also  be  
questions about what assistance in all this should be provided for by the State 
and what can be left to individual or collective initiative beyond the State, 
perhaps with State regulation but without State ownership or control. 
Government will perforce be limited, however, if the aim is to secure and 
ensure room for freely chosen life plans. 
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What sort of society would optimise opportunities for the pursuit of freely 
chosen life plans and patterns of devotion? The liberal political thinker aims 
at realising the greatest chance for the greatest number of people to pursue 
their own interests unfettered by irrational forces or alienating institutions or 
customs. This requires knowledge of and respect for the norms of conduct of 
rational inquiry in all its various forms. And it requires doing what one can to 
realise a society that can institutionally cherish those norms and enable them 
to flourish. 
 
Third step: human history, and especially the history of Europe, is the movement 
of increasing progress in realising such a society; human history, and especially 
the history of Europe, is the movement of the emancipation of rational 
subjectivity in time: from its origins in primitive human animality, human societies 
are  moving   in   stages   towards   the   optimal   realisation   of  man’s   rational   powers   in   a 
properly civilised society, with Europe at the head. 
 
Husserl’s   remarks   about   the  world-view of modern European man suggest 
that what I am calling the classical liberal view is in crisis. Suddenly the 
movement of our history seems not to be taking the path we thought we were 
on. History seems no longer a sequence of increasingly congenial spiritual 
worlds  but  a  random  series  of  worlds  that  “form  and  dissolve  themselves  like  
fleeting  waves”. 
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Neoliberal Hegemonies  
 
What has gone wrong? What is to be done? I said I would go back to Plato. I 
am not going to say just yet what he proposed as the way to get us on track. 
But I do want to preface everything I am going to say here with the words 
that prefaced his own account of what is to be done. In the course of his 
discussion of an ideal form of society, Plato claims that there is a fault to all the 
forms of society that have ever actually existed that prevents them from 
running as they should – prevents them running, that is to say, in anything 
like the way the ideal state would run. But Plato also thought that there was a 
way of putting things right, and very surprisingly, he supposed there was just 
one thing needful. Here is Plato, speaking through Socrates, in conversation 
with  Glaucon  and  Adeimantus  (Plato’s  elder  brothers): 
“I   think   we   can   show   that   the   transformation   can   be   effected   by   a  
single  change,”  I  said,  “but  it’s  hardly  a  small  or  easy  one,  though  it  is  
possible.” 
“Tell  us  what  it  is.” 
“I’m  now  facing  what  we  call  the  biggest  wave,”  I  replied.  “I’ll  tell  you  
what   it   is,   even   if   it   swamps   me   in   a   surge   of   laughter   and   I’m  
drowned  in  contempt.”  (Plato  1974,  473c,  p.  262) 
The laughter and contempt has not gone away. And I imagine it will return in 
another wave when the reader reaches the conclusion of this text too. So be it. 
 
To introduce the Platonic cause of the wave of laughter, first recall the 
Husserlian   anxiety   with   the   waves   of   failure.   Husserl’s   paradoxical  
suggestion is that a new doubt about progress in human history arises in the 
wake of the undeniable progress   in   what   should   be   humanity’s   greatest  
achievement: in the European sciences of nature. I will be affirming a 
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variation of that thought in this essay but it is a variation that conceives 
Husserl’s  own position as part of the problem. Husserl cleaves to the thought 
that philosophy too should aim to be a science of some (very special) sort: 
namely, a science of the transcendental ideality of the essence of everything 
empirically objective. While the kind of knowledge in view here (a radical 
form of self-knowledge) has a modern form (taking its point of departure 
from the thinking subject, the ego cogito),  Husserl’s  account  of   ideal  essences  
as the (non-spatio-temporal   or   irreal)   “objects”   of   some   sort   of   “intuition”  
displays  a  cognitivism  about  philosophy’s  results  that  has  been  a  mainstay  of  
philosophy since Greek antiquity, and has a fundamental source in 
Platonism.ii I   will   want   to   refer   Husserl’s   worries   to   an   understandable  
anxiety that arises when such cognitivism is no longer something we can 
seriously   entertain.   However,   I   won’t   take   that   to   negate   his   general  
conception  of  the  formation  of  modern  Europe’s  societies;  the  conception  of  a  
form of communalisation that is fundamentally shaped by the emergence of 
philosophy in Greek antiquity. And it is to Plato that I want to turn first for an 
explanation  of  why   it  may  be  that  “all  the  shapes  of  the  spiritual  world”  we  
have   witnessed   hitherto   might   seem   to   amount   to   no   more   than   “fleeting  
waves”. 
 
Plato compares governance in states with captaincy on ships: 
Suppose the following to be the state of affairs on board a ship or ships. 
The captain is larger and stronger than any of the crew, but a bit deaf 
and short-sighted, and similarly limited in seamanship. The crew are 
all quarrelling with each other about how to navigate the ship, each 
thinking he ought to be at the helm…  They   spend   all   their   time  milling  
round the captain and doing all they can to get him to give them the 
helm. If one faction is more successful than another, their rivals may 
kill them and throw them overboard, lay out the honest captain with 
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drugs or drink or in some other way take control of the ship….   (Plato  
1974, 488b, p. 282, emphasis mine.) 
In the spirit of this description, I want to propose the following hypothesis. 
The history of efforts to realise the classical liberal conception of human 
flourishing – efforts to achieve the emancipation of rational subjectivity – 
have been subject to more than one neoliberal usurpation or coup by some 
faction or (as I will put it) community of ideas that wants to achieve hegemony. 
 
The thought here is that, like the factions attempting to seize control of the 
ship, efforts to optimise opportunities for leading a life proper to rational 
subjectivity have given rise to movements that attempt to achieve the 
hegemonic domination of the norms that belong to only one of the domains of rational 
life. Those who belong to the community of ideas that represent or defend the 
interests of just one of the domains of life attempt to take charge of the whole; 
they  attempt  to  “take  control  of  the  ship”,  they  want  to  seize  power,  become  
hegemonic, and thence, for as long as they hold the reins of power, displace 
and subordinate the interests of every other domain to their own interests. 
Plato’s   ship   seems   occasionally   to   be   overwhelmed   by   its   factions.   On   the  
story I am telling, that achievement is really very rare. Mostly we have been 
ruled  by  the  “deaf  and  short-sighted”  who  are  “limited  in  seamanship”. 
 
I define neoliberalism in general, then, as the outlook of a community of ideas 
that seeks the limitless extension of the norms of conduct of one domain of life to the 
whole of life. Its emancipatory claim is that it will achieve the optimal 
flourishing of the whole of life by co-ordinating and controlling it in terms 
dictated by the norms of that one domain. The guiding assumption of every 
neoliberal community of ideas is that human flourishing in life in general 
requires that one particular domain of life – the interests of one particular 
community of ideas – should rule. 
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Anachronisms are (perhaps) piling up.iii The liberal conception I am 
describing will have only recently taken that name, and the term 
neoliberalism is of even more recent vintage, and passes for many today as a 
kind of catch-all for Everything Bad About Capitalism. However, 
conceptually speaking the two terms together are well suited for this 
discussion, particularly if we accept that behind the various appeals to the 
idea of neoliberalism made today, there is a basic (if typically poorly 
articulated) conception of it as a hegemonic movement that seeks the limitless 
extension of the market model to all spheres of life; a kind of realisation of 
ourselves as homo economicus. Neoliberalism in our time is, that is to say, 
understood as an economic neoliberalism. It is construed as an ideological 
conception that says every problem has a market solution or a solution within 
the logic of the market. Proponents of it might say: the aim of applying 
market-orientated reasoning everywhere is to optimise the conditions for 
human flourishing in general.iv 
 
It is important to distinguish this kind of economic neoliberalism from, for 
example, policy preferences for the privatisation of previously state-
controlled sectors of an economy. That aspiration is compatible with classical 
liberalism, which would accept that certain kinds of activity might flourish 
most  successfully  if  they  are  subject  to  the  rigours  of  “market  disciplines”;  of  
competition, of profitability, and so on. The classical liberal would not think, 
however, that every domain of life should likewise be governed by these 
norms (cultivation of fairness among friends, love, beauty, wisdom, etc have 
other, incommensurable, norms). The defining feature of the community of 
ideas that seeks the hegemony of economic neoliberalism is not a demand 
that any and every entity be held in private hands but that there is no domain 
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of life that is not appropriately subject to the rule of market-oriented 
reasoning. 
 
To give an example that will prove not to be one example among others, 
consider the university. Not every classical liberal will have principled 
objections to the idea of a private university, and some might even have a 
preference for that. But the classical liberal will not think that what is called 
“success  in  academic  inquiry”  should  itself  be  conceived  and  measured  in  the  
terms appropriate to a business model, nor would such a liberal regard the 
activity of a university as something to be measured exclusively by its 
contribution to economic interests outside it. The economic neoliberal 
disagrees on both fronts: academics deliver products to consumers and those 
products can be assessed in the same way we assess any product or 
commodity: in terms of satisfying consumer preferences. Moreover, the 
university as a part of wider society should also be judged in terms of its 
service to national (or more generally commercial) economic goals and 
interests. A classical liberal might object that while running a university on 
business lines is fine, the best way of doing so, the best way of delivering the 
most   competitive   institution,   is,   as   far   as   possible,   to   free   a   space   of   “play”  
within the general economy that maximises the opportunity for rational inquiry to 
be unfettered by anything, whether immediate student satisfaction, rapid 
external impact or exploitable commercial relevance.v I’ll  come  back  to  this. 
However, there is a feature of our time that Husserl remarks on in the passage 
I began with that fundamentally interrupts this a-historical conceptual contrast 
between classical liberalism and economic neoliberalism, and it is a feature 
that can make one feel altogether despairing: namely, the absence in our time 
(unless we are Marxists)   of   the   kind   of   substantive   “philosophy   of   history”  
through which the classical liberal conception, in its third step, had 
understood our lives. We live in a time which, whether temporarily or 
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permanently we do not know, has more or less abandoned such grand 
historical narratives of world history. The idea of the history of the world as 
the emancipation and progress of rational subjectivity is (I will claim) simply 
no longer credible (no more than the idea of world history as leading towards 
the emancipation of the working subject qua universal subject).  
 
In such a time – in a time when (believe me) we have become increasingly 
resistant to such teleological meta-narratives – the only game in town for 
decision makers within the social world is to make  attempts  at  making  “the  
system”   function  without   undue  problems;  of   improving   the   “efficiency”  of  
institutions,  of  seeking  the  “optimization  of  the  system”  – with no higher end 
but improving its functioning (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiv). In other words, into the 
space left open by the falling away of classic discourses of emancipation and 
progress, the community of ideas that champions economic neoliberalism and 
its market criteria of efficiency and performativity have been able to occupy 
the field virtually unchallenged. With regard to those who get caught up in 
any neoliberal  seizure  of  power,  the  imperative  is  simple:  “be  operational  (that  
is, be commensurable [with the norms of the hegemonic domain]) or 
disappear”   (Lyotard   1984,   p.   xxiv).  With   economic   neoliberalism there is a 
“level   of   terror”   associated  with   this   hegemony   that   is   very   often,   as   Jean-
François   Lyotard   says,   “hard”,   utterly   unforgiving   (Lyotard   1984,   p.   xxiv).  
And, as Husserl anticipates, it all seems despairingly hopeless, making our 
existence fundamentally pointless, tragically meaningless. 
 
It  doesn’t  look  good.  But  the  situation  only  seems  one  of  existential  “crisis”  if,  
with Husserl, you think that the only way our lives could be regarded as 
meaningful is against the background of the thought that world history 
follows a teleological or teleo-eschatological path, program or design 
(whether of God, nature or man). Husserl thinks we cannot find consolation 
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in anything short of such a background. How can the history of the entelechy 
of rational subjectivity be other than teleological? Indeed, how can it. So 
perhaps  it  is  not  the  history  of  rational  subjectivity… 
 
In the face of this new situation, if we are to learn to see it as something other 
than the total disaster for European societies today that Husserl worries 
about, we need to learn two things. First, (pace classical liberalism in its third 
step) we need to learn to see that the idea of living a worthwhile life – what 
Husserl calls a meaningful existence – really does not depend on the truth of a 
teleological philosophy of world history. And second, (pace economic 
neoliberalism in its first step) we need to learn to see that the form of social 
life which Husserl so clearly, and in my view rightly, wants to protect and 
defend – namely, (and here we see the point of the university example) one 
which   is   cultivated   or   irrigated   by   and   in   turn   cultivates   what   he   calls   “a  
community   of   purely   ideal   interests”   (Husserl   1970,   p.   287),   what   Jacques  
Derrida calls (keeping the old name for strategic   purposes)   “the   university  
without   condition”   (Derrida   2002,   p.   202)   – cannot be sustained, or has no 
chance, in conditions of the limitless extension of economic reason, the logic of 
the market. 
 
In our time, what one might call the historical task for European societies may 
appear modest. Instead of striking out towards a final end of history, the task 
as I see it is to protect and defend a form of communalization hitherto most 
strongly (but not by any means exclusively) linked to the history of European 
universities, the development of which is inseparable from what Immanuel 
Kant claimed to be the distinctive European cultural achievement: the 
formation   of   an   “educated public which has existed uninterruptedly from its 
origin [in classical antiquity]  to  our  times”  (Kant  1970,  p.  52).  This  is  a  form  of  
communalization   that,   as   Husserl   puts   it,   “spreads   out   from   philosophy”  
Varieties of Neoliberalism 
   14 
(Husserl 1970, p. 286). In other words, and it can now be seen this is not such 
a modest proposal, the task is one in which the community of ideas 
(supposing for a moment that it is one) that has classically championed the 
unfettered inquiry after truth – the community, that is to say, of those we call 
“philosophers”  and  its  distinctive  will to truth – sustains within society, and as 
dissidents in an era of economic neoliberalism, a certain will to power. 
 
 
Unless we are Marxists  
 
What I want to represent as the opposite of the kind of culture that this aspires 
to is the one found in apocalyptic texts such as Brave New World and 1984.  
Here the idea is so to arrange things that the main forms of self-
understanding available are of a sort that conditions people to want to be 
“operational”  in  a  life  that  is,  as  it  were,  essentially  hostile  to  the  will  to  truth.  
On this view, to keep the system performing you only need to ensure that 
enough people think they are living worthwhile lives, and so are more or less 
happily operational creatures of the ruling hegemonic order. They think they 
are living worthwhile lives, but really they are not. They are alienated by the 
system – but they think they are not. 
 
Some  theorists  of  Europe’s  contemporary  condition  encourage  us  to  think  that  
our  situation   is  already  rather   like   this.  For   example,  some  see   in  Foucault’s  
ideas  of  “governmentality”  (Foucault  2007)  something  very  like  the  vision  of  
life imagined in 1984. And Marxism has long held the view that our 
appreciation of our condition is systematically distorted. Here, from the 
Marxist thinker Alex Callinicos, is one way of making this point: 
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To diagnose alienation is to draw a contrast between the present 
situation, where the subject may be misled by appearances into failing 
to recognise her loss, and a counterfactual condition of authenticity, 
where she has all the powers proper to her. (Callinicos 2006, p. 4) 
At least part of the problem with this kind of diagnosis is that it depends on 
having or claiming to have at our disposal now a viewpoint that is in principle 
immune from the allure of such present appearances, and which others now 
frankly and sadly lack. The worry is not that you need exclusively to inhabit 
such a viewpoint but that some people, unlike most of us in this condition, are 
nevertheless sometimes able to do so. And, as the sketch from Callinicos 
suggests,  this  seems  to  require  that  one  has  at  one’s  disposal  a  conception  and  
grasp of the powers that really are “proper”   to   human   beings.   That   kind   of  
cognitivist presumption (the idea that there is something to be known on this 
subject – call it a truth or meaning of man) is fundamental to classical liberal 
political thought as I am (anachronistically and misnomically) presenting it 
here. And it is a cognitivism about the truth or meaning of man that is, round 
here at least, increasingly found incredible. As David Wiggins put it in the 
midst of the Cold War: 
Unless we are Marxists, we are more resistant [today] than the 
eighteenth- or nineteenth-centuries knew how to be [to] attempts to 
locate the meaning of human life or human history in mystical or 
metaphysical conceptions – in the emancipation of mankind, or 
progress, or the onward advance of Absolute Spirit.vi 
In our time – and this is what really worries Husserl too – we no longer find it 
compelling, indeed we seem profoundly to resist, conceiving issues 
concerning the worth of our lives in terms of a contrast between a final or 
objective truth of man, a truth which the well-adjusted mind manages, 
despite alluring appearances, to adjust itself to, and various kinds of deluded 
conceptions which are the upshot of being misled by the shadow play of 
Varieties of Neoliberalism 
   16 
appearances. On the other hand, as we shall see, the idea of a contrast 
between the meaningful and the meaningless life, a contrast that Callinicos 
(with Plato, Kant, Nietzsche, Husserl, et. al.) implicitly insists on, is something 
I will not want to give up on at all. Moreover, we can be encouraged in this by 
noting that a concern with this kind of contrast is not in the least restricted to 
an epistemically privileged minority. On the contrary, it seems to me that 
even   today   the  number  of  willing  “victims  of   the  system”,   those  who  might  
be  thought  of  as  “misled  by  appearances  into  failing  to  recognise  [their]  loss”,  
is shrinkingly small. For example, it is encouraging how few people actually 
seem to want a society everywhere framed by the norms of economic 
neoliberalism: in contrast to a conception of a life that most of us are already 
quite capable of imagining, it is hard to find anyone who thinks the current 
neoliberal hegemony is likely to realise it.vii 
 
So we certainly need to retain that idea of a contrast. But we should abandon 
the idea of an epistemically privileged viewpoint doing so. We need to accept 
that among the conditions under which people can be said actually to be living 
anything short of a worthwhile life are conditions in which people actually 
think they are. (Values are like secondary qualities in that respect.) Myths of 
governmentality and radical alienation encourage the idea that the social 
world we inhabit creates conditions in which people can think they are living 
worthwhile lives when really they are not, and hence that the reforms or 
revolutions that would be needed are at once virtually wholesale, and (given 
people’s   thoughts   on   the   subject)   depressingly   unrealisable.   But,   first,   (if  
values are like secondary qualities) it is not clear to me that the premise of 
such radical alienation makes any sense, nor, second, does it seem to be true 
that we really are so fully duped by the system. 
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For reasons that should now be becoming much clearer, I want to illustrate 
this second point once more with the university example (although, again, not 
one example among others). Here is an attestation from a participant of some 
unremarkable – but really important – truths about the limits of economic 
neoliberalism with respect to the temporality of intellectual achievement:  
Higher education is not about results in the next quarter but about 
discoveries that may take – and last – decades or even centuries. 
Neither the abiding questions of humanistic inquiry nor the winding 
path of scientific research that leads ultimately to innovation and 
discovery can be neatly fitted within a predictable budget and 
timetable. (Faust, 2009) 
Values related to such economic-incalculables really do struggle to be heard 
under an increasingly economic neoliberal hegemony, but that does not mean 
that   participants   are   typically   “misled   by   appearances”   into   failing   to  
recognise them. It is hard to imagine that anyone who is not benefiting 
personally from the formation of “executive   teams”   in   university  
administrations could feel remotely close to the language in the document, 
from   King’s   College   London   in   2010,   which   explained   that   the   institution  
must   “create   financially   viable   academic   activity  by  disinvesting from areas 
that are at sub-critical   level  with   no   realistic   prospect   of   extra   investment”.  
This is truly, madly, and deeply stupid.viii And in the end that is always going 
to be the kind of reason why we should decisively resist those who belong to 
the community of ideas that promotes the economic neoliberal hegemony. It 
is why we do.  
 
On the other hand, I would not reject it here as the Vice of Capitalism (if there 
is such a thing as Capitalism, or such a thing as Capitalism as such, which I 
doubt; we know today better than before that, insofar as we can speak of it, 
there are Varieties of Capitalism, with a variety of Vices and Virtues). Of far 
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greater significance, I think, is that in a time of incredulity towards the great 
historical narratives of emancipation and progress, we understandably 
struggle in these conditions coherently to articulate our (continuing) interest 
in emancipation and progress themselves. And in a situation in which the 
community  of  ideas  that  calls  for  the  functional  “optimization  of  the  system”  
and  its  ever  greater  “efficiency”  in  terms  of  economic  norms  holds  so  much  of  
the field, prospects for those classic interests can seem bleak indeed.  
 
Nevertheless,  there  is  no  reason  to  suppose  that  the  “performativity”  criterion  
has to be dominated by a neo-liberal  community  of  ideas.  The  “level  of  terror”  
endured by those expected to be operational is not bound to  be   “hard”,   and  
beyond   reform.   Indeed,   “the   performativity   of   the   system”   itself   has   no  
chance at all if its continued functioning is constantly threatened by 
dissatisfaction, demoralisation and resentment. And yet this still sounds 
immensely  depressing.  I  mean,  what’s  the  point of  all  this  “functioning”?   
 
We have for a long time supposed that it is the progressive movement of our 
forms of social life towards distant ideals that alone gives meaning to our 
lives. But one does not have to have such a teleological vision in view to 
affirm that the future matters to us: one can simply want to make it so that 
what one does, individually and collectively, here and now will have been 
some kind of a progressive preface to what remains to come, without any 
such vision of a final end. Elsewhere in the same essay cited a moment ago, 
Wiggins recalls that part of the unease that many feel about factory farming, 
intensive livestock rearing, the general spoliation of nature, and the extinction 
of innumerable animal species is that it shows us modern men and women, as 
in a mirror, as at certain points akin to a form of life we might well think 
“profoundly   alien”:   akin,   that   is,   to   an   animal   with   “no   non-instrumental 
concerns and no interest in the world considered as lasting longer than the 
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animal  in  question  will  need  the  world  to  last  in  order  to  sustain  the  animal’s  
own  life”  (Wiggins  1987,  p. 1124). Such a life is no preface to what remains to 
come at all,  and  “functioning”  to  such  a  destructive  end  is  not  just  depressing  
but  runs  totally  against  the  grain  of  a  participant’s  sense  of  the temporal  “here  
and  now”  of  a  human  life  as  one  in  which  “the  dead  and  the  unborn  are  also  
present”  (Scruton  2012,  p.  234).  The  time  of  our   lives   is  one  which  “connects  
us  to  worlds  before  and  after  us”  (Scruton  2012,  234). Our lives, our sense of 
who we are, is conceived out of and within that temporal stretch. 
“Functioning   to   no   end”   might   describe   the   infrastructure   of   a   presently  
operational life-support system, but not the horizon of a human life worth 
living; the milieu of   our   “spiritual   worlds”   – the   “locus   of   our   cares   and  
endeavours”   (Husserl,   1970,   p. 272) – is   a   “present”   that   should be 
fundamentally linked to those who are not there.ix Derrida summarises as 
follows: 
It is in the name of justice that it is necessary to speak about ghosts, 
inheritance, and generations, generations of ghosts, which is to say 
about   certain   others   who   are   not   present,   nor   presently   living…No  
ethics, no politics, whether revolutionary or not, seems possible and 
thinkable and just that does not recognise in its principle the respect for 
those others who are no longer or for those others who are not yet 
there, presently living, whether they are already dead or not yet born. 
No justice seems possible or thinkable without the principle of some 
responsibility, beyond all living present, before the ghosts of those who 
are not yet born or who are already dead, be they victims of war, 
political or other kinds of violence, nationalist, racist, colonialist, sexist, 
or other kinds of exterminations, victims of the oppressions of 
capitalist imperialism or any of the forms of totalitarianism. (Derrida 
1994, xix. Sentence order occasionally altered for clarity.) 
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And I think Husserl is right to think that for European humanity the 
characteristic  of  the  “spiritual  worlds”  that  flow  through  us  that  is  most worth 
defending is inseparable from the astonishing development there of what 
Husserl   calls   the   “community   movement   of   education   [Bildung]”   (Husserl  
1970,  p.   286),   an   enculturation   tied   to   the   “ancient   canons”   that  Kant   has   in  
view   in   his   description   of   modern   Europe’s   “uninterrupted”   classical  
heritage. Tied to those canons – but   not   “bound   to   the   soil”   of   any   specific  
region or locale (Husserl 1970, p. 286). It is a European cultural (spiritual) 
milieu, then, without radical attachment to any specific geographical milieu, 
European or otherwise.  
 
We  inherit  these  “ancient  canons”.  But  it   is  not  something  to  inherit  without  
more ado. Indeed, it is also the heritage of the anthropocentric, androcentric 
and Eurocentric conception of the meaning of human life and history – the 
conception of man – that today we are more resistant to than the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries knew how to be. And yet, for reasons I will return 
to,  I  am  at  one  with  Derrida  in  affirming  that  these  “ancient  canons…ought  to  
be protected at any price”  (Derrida,  2002,  p.  208,  my  emphasis).  The  basic  claim  
of the philosopher, then, is that it is the classical European culture – 
supranational in its essential tendency – “that  radiates  out  from  philosophy”  
(Husserl 1970, p. 286), that radiates out from the community of ideas (if it is 
one) committed to unfettered inquiry after truth, it is that will to truth, which 
must,  today  more  than  ever,  assert  its  will  to  power.  Hahahahaha… 
 
We know that the hegemony of economic neoliberalism will not do. However, 
I want to add immediately, that things will not be helped if power is seized 
instead by those who belong to the community of ideas that seeks the 
hegemony of political neoliberalism – the limitless extension of the political to 
every sphere of life. Here the force jostling for hegemonic power is not the 
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one that calls for the maximisation of utility, but the one that calls for the 
maximisation of equality. While it seems to be on a distinctly more gilded path 
than its economic neoliberal cousin, with respect to becoming operational 
within its hegemony, political neoliberalism is, if anything, worse. I will 
explain. 
 
 
The Varieties of Neoliberalism  
 
In the course of a remarkable history, part of the post-War settlement in 
Europe – part of the slow turn towards the current economic neoliberal form 
of  “optimization  of  the  system”  – has been the emergence of an increasingly 
professional, managerial, and technocratic political class, and a 
correspondingly dramatic falling away of political participation by the 
citizenry. This has led many to call for a re-politicisation of society in a more or 
less traditional sense: the mobilisation of a citizenry who actively, self-
consciously and especially directly participate in projects aiming at the 
realisation of greater social and economic equality. This desire for traditional 
re-politicisation in a time of economic neoliberal hegemony is totally 
understandable and not in itself unwelcome – but insofar as it seeks social 
hegemony for political reason it remains nonetheless, in my view, wrong and 
misguided.  
 
In the last three-hundred years, European humanity has experienced a 
fundamental changeover in its default understanding of the world and the 
significance of our lives: from a primarily religiously construed default (God 
and  God’s   plan   for  man),   to   one  which   is   not   religiously   construed   (man’s  
Varieties of Neoliberalism 
   22 
plan for man). Although they do not fully or simply hold the field in these 
periods, each is characterised by the significant presence and activism of two 
communities of ideas, two distinctively teleo-eschatological visions of a 
neoliberal hegemony: a radical religious neoliberal faction in the Middle-Ages 
prior to the Enlightenment, followed by factions that desire a political 
neoliberal hegemony in the wake of the general movement of democratisation 
which flows out of the French Revolution. The first supposes that every 
problem has (or ought to have finally) a religious solution. The second 
supposes that every problem has (or ought to have finally) a political one. 
And we have here the germ of the political neoliberal ideal of a society in 
which a completed political hegemony will have finally transformed social 
conditions   so   as   finally   to   realise   the  good   life   (on   earth).  Europe’s  political  
history is inseparable from the growth of this idea.x There have been many, 
many great political victories and developments in this time, not least the 
long struggle   for   and   still   painfully   uneven   progress   of   women’s   equality.  
However, when political reason achieves hegemony, in a society in which the 
political saturates life, we do not have a democracy of ideal adequacy: we have 
the worst. Be operational comrade – or disappear. It is a truly terrifying scene 
of political intimidation. Here is Lenin describing the scene of life in 
conditions  of  what  he  calls  “actual equality”: 
For when all have learned to administer and actually do independently 
administer social production, independently keep accounts and 
exercise control over the parasites, the sons of the wealthy, the 
swindlers   and   other   “guardians   of   capitalist   traditions”,   the   escape  
from this popular accounting and control will inevitably become so 
incredibly difficult, such a rare exception, and will probably be 
accompanied by such swift and severe punishment (for the armed workers 
are practical men and not sentimental intellectuals, and they scarcely 
allow anyone to trifle with them), that the necessity of observing the 
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simple, fundamental rules of the community will very soon become a 
habit. (Lenin 2009, pp. 107-8) 
The transition to a communist society takes place, Lenin suggests, through the 
process he thinks of as completing the democratisation of the state. This is a 
transition which brings the need for democratic government – an electorally 
approved political or ruling class – to an end. The end (telos) of democracy is 
thus the end (terminus) of democracy as a state system or regime of 
representative government: it is a condition in which all the members of 
society completely take over the work of adminstration for themselves. At the 
same time that political struggle disappears, society would, as it were, have 
become political through and through, one is a citizen in every dimension of 
one’s  being.  And  if  you  do  not  play  the  game,  if  you  are  not  operational,  you  
are an enemy of the people and you must disappear: your failure to conform 
to   the   norms   in   force   will   “be   accompanied   by   such   swift   and   severe  
punishment”  that  for  most  people  it  will,  understandably  enough,  “become  a  
habit”  to  conform.  A  miserable  habit. 
 
The mobilisation of identitarian affects in the name of equality is the aim of 
those who belong to the community of ideas that seeks hegemonic power in 
political neoliberalism. It was the aim of both national and international 
socialism: the aim is for every properly German citizen or for every properly 
communist comrade to want to be political through and through, a citizen at 
every moment, a comrade to the end, etc. It is the ambition to forge a 
community that really is one because it has become a community that really is 
one.   (“The  whole  of   society  will   have  become  a   single  office”  Lenin  2009,  p.  
107.) Terrifying – at least I think so. 
 
I am sure the reader will now have a good sense about where I am going with 
this, if not why. But to take us there, consider first the following alternatives, 
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the varieties of neoliberalism that have most tenaciously vied for power in 
Europe’s  pre-modern and modern history: 
x Homo Theologicus, Religious Neoliberalism – the limitless extension of 
religious reason to every sphere of life – the aim: to maximise fidelity 
to God. 
x Homo Politicus, Political Neoliberalism – the limitless extension of 
political reason to every sphere of life – the aim: to maximise equality. 
x Homo Economicus, Economic Neoliberalism – the limitless extension of  
economic reason to every sphere of life – the aim: to maximise 
efficiency. 
Perhaps there have been other candidates,xi but the one I want to bring 
onto   the   stage   here   is   Plato’s   “biggest   wave”,   the   one   that   has   surged  
through   the   centuries  of  Europe’s   history,   centuries  of   laughter,   the   joke  
ambition of what we call  “the  philosopher”.  Plato’s  cause:   the  philosopher 
kings.  
 
The Platonist conception was, as I have indicated, problematically 
cognitivist. It implies that the ruler possesses peculiar and distinctive 
knowledge of the essence of everything empirically actual, every domain of 
life, and hence is best placed to rule over the whole of life in an ideally just 
way.  A  novel  form  of  this  cognitivism  survives  in  Husserl’s  subjectivised  
transcendental  phenomenology  too,  which  he  had  hoped  would  effect  “a  
complete reorientation  of  view”  for  man  (Husserl  1970,  p.  18)  in  terms  of  
his   “teleological   sense”   (Husserl   1970,   p.   269).   But   the   history   of   the  
movement Husserl  founded, as well as the wider history of philosophy in 
the last hundred years or so, has witnessed a marked acceleration in what 
one   might   call   a   “deconstructive”   turn   which   exposes   and   turns   away  
from  philosophy’s  Platonist  cognitivism  (turns  away  from  its  ontology  of  
an   “ideal   logos”   of   “pure   idealities”).  However,   one does not have to be a 
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cognitivist of this kind to embrace the neoliberal cause for philosophy inaugurated 
by Plato. Even a radical non-cognitivist, like Nietzsche, can hope to see 
what one might call the limitless extension of philosophical reason to the whole 
of life, can hope to see philosophers,   “actual   philosophers”,   “rule”  
(Nietzsche, 1973, p. 112). 
x Homo Philosophicus. Philosophical Neoliberalism – the limitless 
extension  of  “philosophical  reason”  to  every  sphere  of  life  – the aim: to 
maximise justice.  
The idea of the philosopher as ruler recurs throughout the history of Europe 
in different guises, but always with the biggest wave of laughter and hence 
always remaining ahead of us as merely (perhaps only barely and perhaps 
even  not  really)  “possible”.  “Possible”,  as  Plato  says,  merely  in  the  sense  that  
we can approximate it. As an ideal, impossible, beyond practical, we admit it. 
 
But:  the  impossible  as  “possible”,  we  still  say.  Not  “a  small  change  nor  easy”,  
says Plato. So it seems it will not be coming anytime soon, not tomorrow, and 
not the day after either. But do we even know what such an event would be? 
Do we know what the philosopher rulers to come will look like? For us, 
today,   the   idea   is   still   like   a   joke,   totally   absurd.   It   remains   a   cause…of  
laughter. 
 
 
The Pure Humanity of Man  
 
What then might the philosopher today say this time, once more to save the 
name, to honour the name, of the philosopher king? Plato had his word on the 
idea of a condition in which justice was at one with power. But it depended 
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on   an   idea   of   special   kind   of   knowledge   of   the   supersensible   that   “I 
philosopher”   today   am   not   willing   to   countersign. Instead, today, I will say 
this. This philosophical neoliberalism is fundamentally different to every 
other: the norms of the domain which would want to seize power in this case, 
the norms governing its will to truth, norms concerning what it is to inquire 
philosophically, are not given but remain in question. And in a culture run 
though with an openness to endless philosophical in-questioning, even the 
classical  liberal  idea  of  the  given  “domains  of  interest”  loses  its  rigour.  What  it  
means   to   be   “operational”   in   such   a   neoliberalism   – the practical levels of 
terror – should be optimally minimised. The question of how to live is 
sustained not finally closed. 
 
In a post-cognitivist   world   the   philosopher’s   “knowing”,   ie   what   the  
philosopher specialises in, is no longer the attaining of a certain (special) kind 
of truth, but remains, as Nietzsche notes, inseparable from aiming at a certain 
(maximal) reach of responsibility (Nietzsche 1973, p. 124): not just 
responsibility in this or that (supposed) domain of life (logic, politics, or art, 
for example) – not membership in this or that community of ideasxii – but 
responsible for the whole of life,  and  hence  the  meaning  of  our  existence:  “their  
‘knowing’  is  creating, their creating is a law-giving, their will to truth is – will 
to power”  (Nietzsche  1973,  p.  123). 
 
But  what  do  I  mean  by  our  living  in  “a  post-cognitivist  world”?  Let’s  go  back  
to Wiggins for a moment, and add a little more to his conception of our time: 
Unless we are Marxists, we are more resistant [today] than the 
eighteenth- or nineteenth-centuries knew how to be [to] attempts to 
locate the meaning of human life or human history in mystical or 
metaphysical conceptions – in the emancipation of mankind, or 
progress, or the onward advance of Absolute Spirit. It is not that we 
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have lost interest in emancipation or progress themselves. But whether 
temporarily or permanently, we have more or less abandoned the idea 
that the importance of emancipation or progress (or a correct 
conception of spiritual advance) is that these are marks by which our 
minute speck in the universe can distinguish itself as the spiritual focus 
of the cosmos. 
Wiggins   specifies   our   time   as   “a   time   after   Darwin”   (Wiggins   1987,   p.   91).  
However, his description of human decentring seems clearly to invoke our 
time also and (at least) equally as a time after Copernicus. And this recalls 
Freud’s   discussion   of   the   decentring   “blows   to   narcissism”   in   the   “times   of  
science” (Freud 1963, pp. 284-5): the Copernican blow, in which we can no 
longer conceive our planetary home as the centre of the cosmos; followed by 
the Darwinian blow, in which we can no longer conceive of our animal 
existence as inherently special or the centre of creation; followed, Freud 
thought, by his own blow delivered by psychoanalysis, in which we could no 
longer   even   regard  ourselves  as   “master   in   our  own  house”   (Freud  1993,  p.  
285).   I   have   explored   Freud’s   story   in   detail   elsewhere,xiii and want only to 
suggest here that this movement of decentring blows maps onto the historic 
movement in Europe, so clearly perceived by an anxious Husserl, of 
increasing resistance to philosophies of history which claim to articulate a 
final end of man: the (yes, narcissistic) anthropocentrism, androcentrism and 
Eurocentrism elaborated in classic philosophical history of the world. And at 
this point we might add a fourth decentring blow – linked to the opening 
words  of  Wiggins’  Cold  War  description   from  1976   – suggested by Derrida: 
“the  Marxist  blow”  (Derrida  1994,  pp.  97-8). Not the blow affected by Marx 
with his non-theological, non-mystical, scientific and philosophical account of 
world history as the history of class struggles, but the blow struck by 
Marxism in the twentieth century. As Emmanuel Levinas put it, the greatest 
trauma for Europe in our time is not the work of an extraordinary scientific 
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achievement,  it  is  an  event,  a  terrible  event:  “the  end  of  socialism  in  the  horror  
of  Stalinism,  is  the  greatest  spiritual  crisis  in  modern  Europe…The  noble  hope  
[of Marxism] consisted in healing everything, in installing, beyond the chance 
of individual charity, a regime without evil. And the regime of charity 
becomes  Stalinism  and  [complicitous]  Hitlerian  horror”  (Levinas  2002,  pp.  80–
81). 
The fact that this blow is not the work of a new scientific paradigm in some 
domain   is   of   special   significance.   The   other   blows   knock   “man”   off   his  
pedestal in one way or another, and give us newly decentred ways of 
thinking (about our planet, about our evolution, about our motives) in their 
place. But in the event of the fourth blow (and with the others surging in again 
with it) the whole modern European conception of the meaning of man – the 
conception of man as progressing in a history of the emancipation of rational 
subjectivity from savage human animality to civilised rational society with Europe at 
the head – ceases to be a living or vital discourse on our being. With the advent 
of the nightmare of political neoliberalism – the terrifying failure of the ideal of 
a man-made programme designed (without God, without nature) for the 
complete   emancipation   of   rational   subjectivity   and   the   “end   of  man”   – the 
classic European conception of man finally loses credibility as a discourse 
through which we can understand  the  “who”   that  we  are.   In   the   face  of  the  
horror of Stalinism and Nazism (its inseparable adversary), the old European 
(hi)story of man and the history of man is exhausted, finished. 
 
On   the   other   hand,   as   Wiggins’   declaration   of   a   surviving   commitment to 
emancipation  and  progress  attests,  this  “end”  is  not  a  dead  end.  The  demise  
of the old concept of man and the associated discourse of a movement of 
emancipation  and  progress  towards  a  final  “end  of  man”  does  not  mean  it  is  
all over for us in our time, leaving  us  with  nothing  more  than  “functioning”.  
Derrida puts it like this: 
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In the same place, on the same limit, where history is finished, there 
where a certain determined concept of history comes to an end, 
precisely there the historicity of history begins, there finally it has the 
chance of heralding itself – of promising itself. There where man, a 
certain determined concept of man, is finished, there the pure 
humanity of man, of the other man and of man as other begins or has 
finally the chance of heralding itself – of promising itself. (Derrida 
1994, p. 74) 
What is heralded by the end of the old European self-understanding is the 
chance and the promise of a new self-understanding to come. A self-
understanding  in  which  our  “pure  humanity”  is  no  longer  normed by the old 
prejudices which projected a superiority of European man over every other 
man,  and  which  is  no  longer  simply  opposed  to  “mere  animality”  either.  This  
then is the great task of those creators that Nietzsche called (forth) as the 
philosophers of the future: responsibility for the creation of a new self-
understanding, a new meaning of human existence, beyond 
anthropocentrism, beyond androcentrism, and beyond Eurocentrism -- 
beyond  “man”  in  a  time  that  is  “more and more”  a  time  after  Copernicus.xiv  
 
But   why   “philosophers”? Precisely, as those most committed to the 
preservation and enhancement of the space within the body of our culture for 
what already belongs fundamentally to the formation of its body as a whole: 
to   keep   the   space   open   for   the   “intimate   community”   of   those “bound  
together”   by   their   unconditional   commitment   to   the   “critical   stance   [that]  
resolves   not   to   accept   unquestioningly   any   pregiven   opinion   or   tradition”  
(Husserl  1970,  p.  287),  where  “nothing   is  beyond  question”  (Derrida  2002,  p.  
205). This community – the community of those who do not belong to any 
particular community of ideas – responds to the call within the biggest wave 
of  Europe’s  history:   the   call   to   engage   in   a   renewed  effort   of   “absolute   self-
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responsibility”   (Husserl   1970,   p.   283),   where   “it   is a matter of nothing less 
than   rethinking   the   concept   of   man”   (Derrida   2002,   p.   207).   This   intimate,  
powerless, and yet still forceful community are the guardians of the heritage 
that  gave  life  to  Europe’s  old  universities,  and  to  the  “community  movement  
of education [Bildung]”   those   universities   cultivated.   Whether   or   not   their  
future   waves  must   or   can   or   even   should   be   situated   “within   the   walls   of  
what   is   today   called   the   university”   (Derrida   2002,   p.   236)   – that’s   another  
question. 
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                                                        i    The internal relationship between the classic philosophical history of the world and the 
classic	  discourse	  of	  Europe’s	  modernity	  is	  explored	  in	  detail	  in	  Jacques	  Derrida’s	  1991	  UNESCO lecture: http://www.pum.umontreal.ca/revues/surfaces/vol4/derridaa.html  ii   While	  it	   is	  unforgiving	  in	  the	  extreme	  on	  this	  particular	  point,	  Gilbert	  Ryle’s	  reading	  of	  Husserlian phenomenology at least has the merit of making it. See Ryle, G. (1971), 
“Phenomenology versus	  The	  Concept	  of	  Mind”	  (Collected Papers, London: Hutchinson), 
and	  Ryle,	  G.	  (1971),	  “Phenomenology”	  (Collected Papers, London: Hutchinson).  iii  I	  say	  perhaps,	  because	  finding	  early	  incarnations	  and	  affirming	  “the	  antiquity	  of	   liberal	  
ideas”	   is	   actually very hard to resist (see Scruton, R. 1982, A Dictionary of Political 
Thought, London: Macmillan, p. 270).  iv   This way of describing neoliberalism is not as idiosyncratic as my introduction of it may make it appear. In fact, many thinkers of the contemporary social and political situation 
say	  essentially	  the	  same	  thing,	  and	  what	  one	  might	  call	  “the	  extension	  thesis”	  may	  even	  be the prevailing understanding in academic literature on the subject. Colin Crouch opens his book on this theme with the claim that	   “behind	   [the	   many	   branches	   and	  brands of neoliberalism] stands one dominant theme: that free markets in which individuals maximise their material interests provide the best means of fulfilling human 
aspirations”	  (Crouch,	  The Strange Non-Death of Neoliberalism, Cambridge: Polity Press, 
2011,	   p.	   vii.);	   Peter	   Mclaren	   speaks	   of	   the	   “neoliberals	   wish	   to	   extend	   the	   market	  
principle	   in	   to	   the	   entire	   social	   universe”	   (Mclaren,	   “Class	   Struggle	   Unchained”	   in	  
Radical Voices for Democratic Schooling, eds. P. Orelus and C. Mallot, London: Palgrave, 
2012,	  p.	  26).;	  Paul	  Treanor	  suggests	  that	  the	  “typical”	  expression	  of	  neoliberalism	  is	  the	  
“extension	   of	   the	   market	   principle	   into	   non-economic	   areas	   of	   life”	  (http://web.inter.nl.net/users/Paul.Treanor/neoliberalism.html). I could extend these affirmations of the extension thesis almost ad nauseam. I would recommend, however, the reader takes a look at Jean-François	  Lyotard’s discussion	  of	  “advanced	  liberalism”	  in	  
The Postmodern Condition (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1979) for an astonishingly rich introduction to its historical emergence in the post-War world.  v   I explore this idea of the university in detail in	  Glendinning,	  S	   (2005),	   ‘Thinking	  about	  
(going	  to)	  the	  university’,	  Critical Quarterly, Vol. 47, Nos. 1-2.  vi  Wiggins’	  essay	  was	   first	  published	  in	  1976.	   I	  will	   return	   to	   the	  significance	  of	   the	  Cold	  War context at the end of this paper.  vii  Two points on this. First, it is a strange mantra sometimes heard on the political Left that affirms that people find it hard to imagine an alternative, or have come to think that 
“there	  is	  no	  alternative”	  to	  economic	  neoliberalism	  (fully	  knowing	  that	  they	  themselves  
can	  imagine	  one).	  Of	  course,	  if	  by	  “alternative”	  one	  means:	  “a	  fully	  worked	  out	  political-
economic	  model”,	  then	  I	  am	  sure	  no-one	  can	  “imagine”	  (plan)	  it.	  I	  just	  mean:	  people	  are	  sensitive to injustice and the inadequacy of current conditions. For example, very many people think it is not fair or just that city bankers get such (comparatively) high remuneration for their work, and they can easily imagine conditions in which they do not. Knowing how to bring about those conditions is not required for that sense of injustice – though knowing how even to start to bring about those conditions is obviously no small matter. However, on that point, and second, while most people are quite capable of imagining an alternative to what they see as unjust, I think that too many think they do know how to or what will solve the problem. Supposing, as Husserl 
did	  in	  the	  30s	  and	  we	  might	  well	  today	  too,	  that	  “the	  European	  nations	  are	  sick;	  Europe	  
itself…is	  in	  crisis”	  (Husserl	  1970,	  p.	  270),	  then	  one	  can	  hardly	  deny,	  now	  as	  then, that 
“we	   are	   by	   no	   means	   lacking	   something	   like	   nature	   doctors	   [who	   would	   proscribe	  
“medicine	   for	   nations	   and	   supranational	   communities”].	   Indeed	   we	   are	   practically	  
inundated	  by	  a	  flood	  of	  suggestions	  for	  reform.”	  (Husserl	  1970,	  p.	  270)	  And	  as	  Derrida	  
notes	   similarly,	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   present	   world	   crisis	   “there	   is	   no	   lack	   of	  interpretations or analogies – we	  have	  too	  many	  of	  them”	  (Derrida,	  “Economies	  of	  the	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Crisis”,	   in	  Negotiations,	   Stanford:	   Stanford	   University	   Press,	   p.	   70).	   Although	   it	  won’t	  please those who want everything now, I am inclined at this point to affirm a variation of the thought expressed by Henry David Thoreau: that speaking practically and as a citizen, unlike those who call themselves no-representative-government men and women, I ask for, not at once or soon no-representative-government, but at once and for the foreseeable future, better representative government. (See the opening three 
paragraphs	  of	  Thoreau’s	  great	   text	   “On	  Civil	  Disobedience”.)	  There	   is	  a	   lot	   to	  be	  done	  just there.  viii There have been many excellent discussions which pierce the shiny, powerful but ultimately profoundly fragile façade of economic sophistication in university 
management	  in	  the	  UK.	  See	  for	  example,	  Anthony	  Grafton	  in	  a	  2010	  NYRB	  blog	  “Britain:	  The Disgrace	   of	   the	   Universities”,	   from	   which	   the	   quotation	   from	   King’s	   College	   is	  drawn. http://blogs.nybooks.com/post/437005501/britain-the-disgrace-of-the-universities  ix  I	  explore	  this	  in	  detail	  in	  Glendinning,	  S	  (2014),	  “Settled-there: Heidegger on the work of 
art	  as	  the	  cultivation	  of	  place”,	  Journal of Aesthetics and Phenomenology, Vol. 1, Issue 1.).  x    This	  is	  a	  more	  complicated	  point	  than	  it	  looks.	  Europe’s	  modern	  political	  history	  can	  be	  broadly conceived with a narrative of two narrative paths out of the French revolution: its mainstream history, which is primarily narrated in terms of the development of representative, parliamentary, and liberal democracy (occasionally fired and inspired by, but also typically almost ruined by revolutionary activists); and, alongside and inside that, revolutionary history, which is primarily narrated as a history of betrayals and failures (the results of which revolutionaries will see as unfolding in the development of parliamentary politics) in which efforts to shift to genuine workers 
power	  or	  the	  people’s	  power	  are	  tragically	  thwarted.	  I	  think	  both	  sides	  of	  this	  narrative	  
will	  recognise	  it	  (one	  way	  or	  the	  other).	  (See,	  for	  example,	  Badiou,	  A	  (2006),	  “The	  Paris	  
Commune”,	  in	  Polemics, London: Verso, p. 284). My point is that political neoliberalism belongs with the revolutionary wing of this history. Political liberalism is centre stage in 
the	  mainstream.	  (“The	  captain	  is	  larger	  and	  stronger	  than	  any	  of	  the	  crew,	  but	  a	  bit	  deaf	  and short-sighted, and similarly limited	  in	  seamanship.”)  xi   I am not sure what to say about other possibilities. In principle, the list can be extended as far as you can think of some life interest that someone might wish to rule over the whole of life. For example: 
Homo Romanticus, a (specific) Aesthetic Neoliberalism – the limitless extension of aesthetic reason to every sphere of life – the aim: to maximise beauty. 
Homo Hedonicus, a (specific) Moral Neoliberalism – the limitless extension of moral reason to every sphere of life – the aim: to maximise pleasure.  xii I am picking up here on the remark by Ludwig Wittgenstein (in Zettel, Oxford: Blackwells, 
1981,	  §455)	  that	  heads	  this	  essay:	  “The	  philosopher	  is	  not	  a	  citizen	  of	  any	  community	  of	  ideas. That is what makes him into a philosopher.”  xiii Glendinning,	  S	   (2013),	   “The	  End	  of	   the	  World	  Designed	  with	  Men	   in	  Mind”,	   Journal	   of	  
Historical Sociology, Vol. 26, No. 3.  xiv I am picking up here on the remark by Jacques Derrida (in Specters of Marx, pp. 97-8) 
that	  heads	  this	  essay:	  “The	  Copernican Earth is no longer at the centre of the universe, 
and	  this	  is	  more	  and	  more	  the	  case	  one	  could	  say.” 
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